

**Anti-American Attitudes from the Dual-Process Motivational Perspective:
Evidence from Russia**

Kirill Zhirkov¹, Eduard Ponarin², and Sharon Werning Rivera³

¹ University of Virginia

² HSE University

³ Hamilton College

[Draft. Please don't cite or circulate]

Abstract

In this paper, we explore the psychological motivations of anti-American attitudes from the perspective of the dual-process model (DPM) that emphasizes two basic human motivational goals: preferences for security (driven by the perception of threat) and superiority (driven by the perception of competition). Among established measures in personality psychology, the former most closely corresponds to authoritarianism, whereas the latter is captured by social dominance orientation (SDO). In this paper, we analyze the case of Russia where grievances against the United States were featured prominently in Russia's justification of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Using original survey data, we find that political and cultural grievances against the United States, as well as anti-American attitudes and readiness to engage in a conflict, are predicted by authoritarianism—but not by SDO. Therefore, even in a mid-power country context, anti-American attitudes and support for aggressive foreign policy are motivated by threat rather than competition.

Keywords: anti-American attitudes, dual-process motivational model, Russia

Anti-American attitudes have skyrocketed in Russia since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the further invasion of Ukraine in 2022 accelerated this trend even more. Although recent analyses of public opinion that try to account for the possibility of preference falsification show majority support for the war in the Russian mass public (Chapkovski and Schaub 2022), a non-trivial share of the population still opposes it despite the concentrated efforts of state-run media and resulting social pressures. So, what explains variation in the embrace of an anti-American frame and associated foreign policy attitudes in the Russian population?

A televised address by Vladimir Putin aired on February 24, 2022, aimed at justifying the invasion of Ukraine to the Russian public provides some potential clues.¹ In the address, Putin touched on several important themes that employed anti-American rhetoric. It was substantially focused on the idea that the United States and the West represented a threat to Russia's security and sovereignty. Putin's speech listed a number of political grievances against the United States, such as the eastward expansion of NATO despite Russian objections. He also mentioned cultural grievances like the destruction of the traditional values that "erodes" Russian society from within. Unwittingly, the speech almost perfectly laid out a dual-process model (DPM), in which attitudes are shaped by two basic psychological motivations: security (as a response to threat) and superiority (as a response to competition).

The purpose of this paper is to assess whether the DPM can explain why some Russians are receptive to Putin's claims about the United States and others are not. Using original survey data, we demonstrate that authoritarianism (an orientation driven by the security motivation) is a better predictor of anti-Western grievances, anti-American attitudes, and support for international confrontation than social dominance orientation (driven by the superiority motivation). We

¹ <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828>

discuss the implications of our findings for public diplomacy in the current conflict—as well as for the broader research on personality psychology in international relations.

Threat, Competition, and Anti-American Attitudes

The literature on anti-American attitudes, in both psychology and political science, reflects debates about the relative weight of their political vs. cultural character. A number of studies compare the impact of political and cultural grievances on support for anti-American violence, primarily in the Muslim world, and conclude that politics is more important than culture (Sidanius et al. 2004; Tessler and Robbins 2007; Zhirkov, Verkuyten, and Weesie 2014).

However, anti-American grievances are rhetorical tools themselves: they are first articulated by the political elites and then spread to the mass public via the channels of political communication (Blaydes and Linzer 2012; Sokolov et al. 2019). Therefore, it is still necessary to understand what psychological motivations make someone receptive to these grievances.

Recently, researchers investigating anti-American attitudes in the Arab world have formulated a hypothesis with regard to their psychological underpinnings (Jamal et al. 2015). Specifically, they postulate that anti-American attitudes stem from the perceived threat of intervention into a country's internal affairs by a powerful foreign actor. However, the empirical support for these claims comes from Arab countries that do not compete with the United States in the international arena. Researchers who study anti-Americanism in other countries and regions may need to consider other psychological motivations. Russia is a good example in this regard: it is one of the few countries that see themselves as regional powers—and it has behaved this way at least since the Russo-Georgian War of 2008. As a result, anti-American attitudes within the Russian public can be motivated by perceived competition with the United States as well as by perceived threat.

In our search for explanations that allow for different underlying motivations to produce the same expressed anti-American attitudes, we turn to social and personality psychology. The idea that social and political attitudes are primarily driven by two factors, perception of threat and perception of competition, has been formalized as the DPM (Duckitt 2001; Duckitt and Sibley 2009). The DPM starts from the premise that attitudes are informed by two sets of motivational goals: security, order, and cohesion, on the one hand, and power, dominance, and superiority, on the other. Some objects, such as social groups, are seen as threatening, and negative attitudes toward them are explained by the desire for security, whereas opinions about groups perceived as competitors are predicted by an emphasis on the goal of superiority. In terms of specific and measurable personality variables, attitudes toward threatening targets are most strongly associated with authoritarianism (an orientation emphasizing the desire for security; Stenner 2005), and prejudice toward competing groups primarily follows social dominance orientation or SDO (emphasizing the desire for superiority; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). In other words, authoritarians are sensitive to the perception of threat whereas high-SDO individuals are sensitive to the perception of competition. Figure 1 presents the structure of the DPM—how the two motivations are conceptualized, measured, and related to attitudes.




Figure 1. The DPM: security and superiority as motivations of social and political attitudes

Originally, the DPM has been tested on attitudes toward social groups residing within a country's own borders, and the results confirm its core predictions: authoritarianism and SDO positively predict attitudes like outgroup prejudice and nationalism (Duckitt et al. 2002). At the same time, those high in authoritarianism and SDO exhibit different levels of prejudice and nationalism depending on whether the target groups are perceived as threatening or competitive (Duckitt 2006; Duckitt and Sibley 2007). However, the general logic behind the DPM can be extended into the field of international relations: a respondent's own country can be seen as an analogue of the social ingroup, whereas other countries are external attitudinal objects similar to social outgroups (Satherley and Sibley 2016; Sidanius et al. 2004). Developing this logic, we further contend that foreign countries—like social outgroups in the standard DPM model—can be seen as either threatening or competitive, and motivations postulated by the DPM (security and superiority) can translate to foreign policy goals.

Existing research demonstrates that authoritarianism and perceptions of threat indeed predict foreign policy attitudes (Gadarian 2010; Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Huddy et al. 2005). The same is true for SDO that predicts emphasizing relative rather than absolute advantage in international trade deals (Mutz and Kim 2017). Furthermore, there is evidence that, at least in the Arab world, SDO is associated with anti-American attitudes; specifically, those high in SDO tend to be pro-American (Alexander, Levin, and Henry 2005; Levin et al. 2003). Tests that directly contrast the effects of authoritarianism and SDO on attitudes toward countries—including the United States—have been relatively rare, but they demonstrate that these effects are non-trivial and often opposite in direction (Henry et al. 2005; Levin et al. 2012; Satherley and Sibley 2016).

Scholars of anti-Americanism have been debating whether it should be seen as a form of prejudice or as opposition to U.S. policies, and real-world anti-American attitudes seem to combine both (Chiozza 2009; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007). However, the DPM is applicable to anti-American attitudes in either case because the model can explain both purely affective evaluations (prejudice) and ideologically informed opinions (opposition to policies). In this paper, we implement a test based on the DPM by using authoritarianism and SDO to predict political and cultural grievances, anti-American attitudes, and support for confrontation with the United States in the Russian public. This will allow us to understand whether anti-American attitudes among Russians are predominantly driven by the security motivation and viewing the United States as a threat (if authoritarianism is a better predictor) or by the superiority motivation and perceiving the United States as a competitor (if SDO is a better predictor).

Data and Method

In March 2020, we carried out an online survey on a convenience sample of 806 Russian adults.² Respondents were recruited using an opt-in proprietary panel maintained by a Russian firm Anketolog. The sample characteristics are as follows. The mean age is 39.6 years (40.5 years nationally) and the gender ratio is 38.2% male to 61.8% female (46.5 to 53.5 nationally).³ Higher education was reported by 74.4% of respondents (56.7% nationally) and approximately 71% of the sample live in a city (74.8% nationally). Finally, 88.2% of respondents are ethnic Russians (80.9% nationally). Overall, our sample is somewhat skewed toward female and higher-educated respondents but still exhibits a reasonable degree of demographic variation.

² The survey was fielded in Russian, but in the paper, we provide English translations of the materials.

³ National demographic data are from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service: rosstat.gov.ru

Respondents started the survey by completing batteries of questions on political and cultural grievances against the United States and the West (with randomized order). We asked about their political and cultural justifications of anti-American attitudes separately given the prominence of this distinction in the literature (Sidanius et al. 2004; Tessler and Robbins 2007; Zhirkov, Verkuyten, and Weesie 2014). This is a sample question on political grievances: “Russia’s economic problems in the 1990s were caused by West’s deliberate efforts, not missteps of the Russian leadership.” And here is a sample question on cultural grievances: “Propaganda of homosexuality in the modern West is a real problem that threatens Russian society.” Responses were coded on a 4-point Likert-type scale from 1 = *Strongly disagree* to 4 = *Strongly agree*. See Supplementary Material for the full batteries of questions and details on their administration in the survey.

Then, respondents were presented with the authoritarianism and SDO questions. As a measure of authoritarianism, we used the 4-item child-rearing battery (Feldman and Stenner 1997), which was recently validated in the Russian context (Zhirkov, Ponarin, and Rivera 2023). SDO was measured using a shortened version of SDO₇, the most recent variant of the full version of the scale (Ho et al. 2015). The order of the authoritarianism and SDO scales was randomized. See Supplementary Material for the questions and response options.

Next, respondents were asked two questions about their attitudes to the United States and Americans on a scale from 1 = *Very unfavorable* to 4 = *Very favorable*.⁴ Answers to these two questions with reversed responses were averaged to obtain overall anti-American attitudes. The following question asked respondents about their readiness to engage in an open conflict with the United States (see Supplementary Material for the exact formulation) with scores ranging from 0

⁴ The same question format is used in global opinion surveys by the Pew Research Center.

= *Avoid direct confrontation* to 10 = *Openly challenge the United States*. The distinction between anti-American attitudes and readiness for confrontation was motivated by the expectation that even among those with highly unfavorable opinions of the United States, many would still prefer to avoid direct conflict.

Results

We start by estimating OLS regression models, in which we use authoritarianism, SDO, and demographic controls (age, gender, education, urbanization, and ethnicity) to predict political and cultural grievances, anti-American attitudes, and support for confrontation with the United States. In the analyses, all variables are standardized, so the coefficients can range from -1 (perfect negative relationship) to 1 (perfect positive relationship). Regression coefficients are presented graphically in Figure 2. They show that authoritarianism significantly and positively predicts all four outcomes: authoritarians report higher levels of political grievances ($b = 0.15, p < .001$), higher levels of cultural grievances ($b = 0.26, p < .001$), stronger anti-American attitudes ($b = 0.17, p = .001$), and greater support for confrontation ($b = 0.10, p = .005$). SDO, by contrast, is negatively related to political grievances ($b = -0.10, p = .006$), while not being significantly associated with the other three outcomes.⁵

Even though demographic variables are not the main focus of our study, it is worth noting that age and gender emerge as significant predictors of all four outcomes of interest. Specifically, women and younger respondents express lower levels of political and cultural grievances, weaker anti-American attitudes, and less support for a confrontational foreign policy.⁶ These

⁵ It is important that the null effects are not produced by low variation in either the explanatory variable or the dependent variables. See Table S1 in Supplementary Material for descriptive statistics, including sample standard deviations.

⁶ Interestingly, we do not find similar differences for college-educated respondents, urban dwellers, and those who identify with minority ethnic groups. The only exception is that those residing in large cities score somewhat lower on the index of cultural grievances.

findings suggest a potential shift in Russian society with important real-world implications: attitudes toward the United States and the West may improve in the future simply due to generational replacement.




Figure 2. Authoritarianism, SDO, and demographics as predictors of political and cultural grievances, anti-American attitudes, and support for confrontation
Note. All variables standardized. 95% confidence intervals presented. For full numerical results, see Table S2 in Supplementary Material.

As the second step in our analysis, we estimate a path model that corresponds to the theoretical expectations. Path analysis is used to estimate directed relationships among variables; in other words, it makes assumptions about the causal ordering of the data. In our model, authoritarianism and SDO, first, predict political and cultural grievances that, in turn, lead to anti-Americanism and, ultimately, to support for confrontation. The results are presented in Figure 3. They show that political grievances positively and significantly predict both anti-Americanism and support for confrontation while cultural grievances are associated only with

the former. Therefore, anti-Americanism in Russia seems to have both political and cultural roots. Also, the magnitude of the correlation between the error terms of cultural and political grievances indicates that these variables are positively related but measure distinct phenomena.




Figure 3. The relationships among authoritarianism, SDO, political and cultural grievances, anti-American attitudes, and support for confrontation
Note. $N = 764$. Control variables (not presented due to space considerations) include age, gender, education, urbanization, and ethnicity. See Table S3 in Supplementary Material for full results.

Importantly, a direct effect estimated in the path modeling framework may only partially capture the true relationship between two variables. For instance, according to the model presented in Figure 3, SDO affects support for confrontation both directly and indirectly via political grievances. Therefore, to properly summarize the effects of authoritarianism and SDO on anti-American attitudes and support for confrontation, we also present indirect and total

effects.⁷ The estimates presented in Table 1 show that authoritarianism has positive and significant total effects on both anti-American attitudes and support for confrontation whereas SDO does not. Overall, authoritarianism is significantly and positively related to all outcomes of interest—political and cultural grievances, anti-American attitudes, and support for confrontation—whereas SDO is not. From these results, we can infer that anti-American attitudes in the Russian public are motivated by perceived threat from the United States rather than by perceived competition.

Table 1. Direct, indirect, and total effects of authoritarianism and SDO on anti-American attitudes and support for confrontation

	Anti-American attitudes	Support for confrontation
Authoritarianism		
Direct	0.06* (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Indirect	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Total	0.13*** (0.03)	0.09* (0.03)
SDO		
Direct	0.01 (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)
Indirect	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Total	-0.01 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)

Note. Results are based on the same model as presented in Figure 3. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

⁷ Within the path modeling framework, an indirect effect is the pathway from the explanatory variable to the outcome through a mediator. The direct effect, in turn, is the pathway from the explanatory variable to the outcome while controlling for mediators. The total effect is the sum of the direct effect and any indirect effects.

Conclusion

Our goal in this paper has been to understand the psychological motivations of anti-American attitudes in Russia. We have followed the DPM postulating that anti-American attitudes, as any other form of prejudice, can be motivated by the desire for security and perception of threat (measured by authoritarianism) or by superiority and the perception of competition (measured by SDO). Using an original survey, we have demonstrated that political and cultural grievances, anti-American attitudes, and support for confrontation with the United States are all predicted by authoritarianism—but not by SDO. Therefore, anti-American attitudes in Russia are motivated by threat rather than by competition.

Our findings have important implications for public diplomacy during the current war in Ukraine. They show how authoritarian regimes like Russia can take advantage of real or imagined U.S. intervention threats in order to mobilize domestic support in favor of an aggressive foreign policy. For instance, in his speech to the Federal Assembly just before the one-year anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Putin blamed the West for starting the war and accused it of using Ukraine as a battering ram against Russia.⁸ In the Russian case, our results indicate that those scoring highest on authoritarianism will most likely be receptive to anti-American messaging, while Russians with anti-authoritarian predispositions are likely to remain positive—or at least neutral—toward the United States. At the same time, U.S. efforts to minimize the perception of threat may win over those Russians who are in the middle of the authoritarianism scale.

This emphasis on the importance of perceptions based on threat instead of competition also would seem to challenge scholarship about how concerns about status affect Russians'

⁸ <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70565>

perspectives on the relationship with the West. According to this perspective, Russia has had a status conflict with the West after the Cold War (Forsberg 2014). As the country's status declined, perceived humiliation produced an emotional response among Russian masses and elites that ultimately resulted in widespread preferences for a more assertive, anti-Western foreign policy (Larson and Shevchenko 2014).⁹ Although our results suggest that status competition is less important in Russians' foreign policy opinions, we do not investigate the distinct role of emotions such as anger or fear in anti-American and anti-Western attitudes.

The main limitation of our study concerns its observational character. In our analysis, we assume that authoritarianism and SDO, as stable personality traits, predict attitudes like anti-Americanism that are more malleable. We cannot test this causal mechanism directly because personality traits, such as authoritarianism and SDO, cannot be experimentally manipulated. As a result, the Neyman–Rubin model based on the potential outcomes framework, the main theoretical motivation behind modern causal inference, cannot be applied (Holland 1985). Our study shares this limitation with earlier attempts to study the political implications of personality traits (Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008). However, future studies can try to manipulate the perceptions of threat and competition to see whether they amplify the effects of, respectively, authoritarianism and SDO on anti-American attitudes—and thus test the DPM's prediction regarding differential sensitivities to these perceptions. Unfortunately, implementing such studies at the moment is not feasible because of practical issues with accessing respondents in Russia. The ongoing war should also make it difficult to manipulate the perception of threat among members of the Russian public.

⁹ An alternative explanation of the shift in Russia's foreign policy emphasizes the change in self-perception among the country's elites who are increasingly seeing themselves as defendants of Russian-speaking populations abroad rather than as partners of the West (Strycharz 2022). This change was likely influenced by anti-Western resentment and growing nationalism (Sokolov et al. 2019).

In addition, our analysis linking authoritarianism and anti-American attitudes is limited to a single country, and future research may attempt to replicate it in other contexts such as China, Iran, or Turkey. It might also be interesting to see whether the DPM applies to attitudes toward international actors other than the United States: for instance, how authoritarianism and SDO predict opinions about Russia among Ukrainians or opinions about Turkey in the Syrian mass public. Similarly, it is worth investigating whether the DPM works equally well in the Russian elite sector, where professional backgrounds and political messaging have been shown to be linked with anti-American attitudes (Rivera and Bryan 2019). Overall, our paper once again highlights the importance of studying the psychological antecedents of foreign policy opinions, including in nondemocratic countries. And the authoritarian predisposition, which drives sensitivity to real or imagined threats in addition to submission to authorities, may prove particularly promising in this regard.

References

- Alexander, Michele G., Shana Levin and P. J. Henry. 2005. "Image Theory, Social Identity, and Social Dominance: Structural Characteristics and Individual Motives Underlying International Images." *Political Psychology* 26 (1): 27–45.
- Blaydes, Lisa, and Drew A. Linzer. 2012. "Elite Competition, Religiosity, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World." *American Political Science Review* 106 (2): 225–43.
- Chapkovski, Philipp, and Max Schaub. 2022. "Solid Support or Secret Dissent? A List Experiment on Preference Falsification during the Russian War against Ukraine." *Research and Politics* 9 (2). <https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221108328>
- Chiozza, Giacomo. 2009. *Anti-Americanism and the American World Order*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Duckitt, John. 2001. "A Dual-process Cognitive-Motivational Model of Ideology and Prejudice." In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 33, edited by Mark P. Zanna, 41–113. New York: Academic Press.
- Duckitt, John. 2006. "Differential Effects of Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation on Outgroup Attitudes and Their Mediation by Threat From and Competitiveness to Outgroups." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 32 (5): 684–96.
- Duckitt, John, and Chris G. Sibley. 2006. "Right Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and The Dimensions of Generalized Prejudice." *European Journal of Personality* 21 (2): 113–30.
- Duckitt, John, and Chris G. Sibley. 2009. "A Dual-Process Motivational Model of Ideology, Politics, and Prejudice." *Psychological Inquiry* 20 (2/3): 98–109.
- Duckitt, John, Claire Wagner, Ilouize du Plessis, and Ingrid Birum. 2002. "The Psychological Bases of Ideology and Prejudice: Testing a Dual Process Model." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 83 (1): 75–93.
- Feldman, Stanley, and Karen Stenner. 1999. "Perceived Threat and Authoritarianism." *Political Psychology* 18 (4): 741–70.
- Forsberg, Tuomas. 2014. "Status Conflicts between Russia and the West: Perceptions and Emotional Biases." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 47(3–4), 323–31.
- Gadarian, Shana Kushner. 2010. "The Politics of Threat: How Terrorism News Shapes Foreign Policy Attitudes." *Journal of Politics* 72 (2): 469–83.

- Gerber, Alan S., Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, Conor M. Dowling, and Shang E. Ha. 2010. "Personality and Political Attitudes: Relationships across Issue Domains and Political Contexts." *American Political Science Review* 104 (1): 111–33.
- Henry, P. J., Jim Sidanius, Shana Levin, and Felicia Pratto. 2005. "Social Dominance Orientation, Authoritarianism, and Support for Intergroup Violence between the Middle East and America." *Political Psychology* 26 (4): 569–83.
- Hetherington, Marc J., and Elizabeth Suhay. 2011. "Authoritarianism, Threat, and Americans' Support for the War on Terror." *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (3): 546–60.
- Ho, Arnold K., Jim Sidanius, Nour Kteily, Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington, Felicia Pratto, Kristin E. Henkel, Rob Foels, and Andrew L. Stewart. 2015. "The Nature of Social Dominance Orientation: Theorizing and Measuring Preferences for Intergroup Inequality using the New SDO₇ Scale." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 109 (6): 1003–28.
- Holland, Paul W. 1985. "Statistics and Causal Inference." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 81 (396): 945–60.
- Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber, and Gallya Lahav. 2005. "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (3): 593–608.
- Jamal, Amaney A., Robert O. Keohane, David Romney, and Dustin Tingley. 2015. "Anti-Americanism and Anti-interventionism in Arabic Twitter Discourses." *Perspectives on Politics* 13 (1): 55–73.
- Katzenstein, Peter J., and Robert O. Keohane. 2007. "Varieties of Anti-Americanism: A Framework for Analysis." In *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, 9–38. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Larson, Deborah Welch, and Alexei Shevchenko. 2014. "Russia Says No: Power, Status, and Emotions in Foreign Policy." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 47 (3–4): 269–79.
- Levin, Shana, P. J. Henry, Felicia Pratto, and Jim Sidanius. 2003. "Social Dominance and Social Identity in Lebanon: Implications for Support of Violence Against the West." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 6 (4): 353–68.
- Levin, Shana, Felicia Pratto, Miriam Matthews, Jim Sidanius, and Nour Kteily. 2013. "A Dual Process Approach to Understanding Prejudice toward Americans in Lebanon: An Extension to Intergroup Threat Perceptions and Emotions." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 16 (2): 139–58.
- Mondak, Jeffery J., and Karen D. Halperin. 2008. "A Framework for the Study of Personality and Political Behaviour." *British Journal of Political Science* 38 (2): 335–62.
- Mutz, Diana C., and Eunji Kim. 2017. "The Impact of In-group Favoritism on Trade Preferences." *International Organization* 71 (4): 827–50.
- Rivera, Sharon Werning, and James D. Bryan. 2019. "Understanding the Sources of Anti-Americanism in the Russian Elite." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 35 (5–6): 376–92.
- Satherley, Nicole, and Chris G. Sibley. 2016. "A Dual Process Model of Attitudes toward Immigration: Predicting Intergroup and International Relations with China." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 53: 72–82.
- Sidanius, Jim, P. J. Henry, Felicia Pratto, and Shana Levin. 2004. "Arab Attributions for the Attack on America: The Case of Lebanese Subelites." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 35(4): 403–16.
- Sidanius, Jim, and Felicia Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Sokolov, Boris, Ronald F. Inglehart, Eduard Ponarin, Irina Vartanova, and William Zimmerman. 2019. "Disillusionment and Anti-Americanism in Russia: From Pro-American to Anti-American Attitudes, 1993–2009." *International Studies Quarterly* 62 (3): 534–47.
- Stenner, Karen. 2005. *The Authoritarian Dynamic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Strycharz, Damian. 2022. "Role Change and Russia's Responses to Upheavals in Ukraine." *Foreign Policy Analysis*. Published ahead of print. <https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac017>
- Tessler, Mark, and Michael D. H. Robbins. 2007. "What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts against the United States?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (2): 305–28.
- Zhirkov, Kirill, Maykel Verkuyten, and Jeroen Weesie. 2014. "Perceptions of World Politics and Support for Terrorism among Muslims: Evidence from Muslim Countries and Western Europe." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31 (5): 481–501.
- Zhirkov, Kirill, Eduard Ponarin, and Sharon Werning Rivera. 2023. "The Child-Rearing Scale as a Measure of Authoritarianism in a Non-Western Context: Evidence from Mass and Elite Surveys in Russia." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*. Published ahead of print. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edad005>

Supplementary Material

Survey was fielded in Russian. This is an English translation.

Political grievances

“Below are several statements concerning the relationships between Russia and the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Please tell us how strongly you agree or disagree with each.”

- (1) Spread of the West’s influence on East European countries followed desire to hurt Russian interests, not wishes of those countries’ populations
- (2) Spread of the West’s influence on East European countries followed wishes of those countries’ populations, not desire to hurt Russian interests
- (3) NATO’s military operation against Serbia in 1999 was launched to spread West’s political influence, not stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo
- (4) NATO’s military operation against Serbia in 1999 was launched to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, not spread West’s political influence
- (5) Russia’s economic problems in the 1990s were caused by West’s deliberate efforts, not missteps of the Russian leadership
- (6) Russia’s economic problems in the 1990s were caused by missteps of the Russian leadership, not West’s deliberate efforts
- (7) Current hostility between Russian and Ukraine are caused by West’s intrigues, not Russian leadership mistakes
- (8) Current hostility between Russian and Ukraine are caused by Russian leadership mistakes, not West’s intrigues

Question order randomized.

Respondents are randomly presented with four statements, one from each following pair: (1) and (2), (3) and (4), (5) and (6), (7) and (8).

Answers coded from 1 = *Strongly disagree* to 4 = *Strongly agree*.

Cultural grievances

“Below are several statements concerning the relationships between Russia and the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Please tell us how strongly you agree or disagree with each.”

- (1) Emphasis on individualism in modern Western culture leads to social degradation
- (2) Emphasis on individualism in modern Western culture leads to social progress
- (3) Propaganda of homosexuality in the modern West is a real problem that threatens Russian society
- (4) The problem of homosexuality propaganda in the modern West is fabricated by the Russian government for political reasons
- (5) Western feminism has gone too far and is unacceptable in Russian society
- (6) Russian society can learn a lot from Western feminism in terms of gender equality
- (7) Modern West abandoned its own cultural heritage
- (8) Russia and the West have a lot of common cultural heritage

Question order randomized.

Respondents are randomly presented with four statements, one from each following pair: (1) and (2), (3) and (4), (5) and (6), (7) and (8).

Answers coded from 1 = *Strongly disagree* to 4 = *Strongly agree*.

Social dominance orientation

“Below are several statements concerning the relationships between Russia and the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Please tell us how strongly you agree or disagree with each.”

- (1) An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom
- (2) Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups
- (3) No one group should dominate in society
- (4) Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top
- (5) Group equality should not be our primary goal
- (6) It is unjust to try to make groups equal
- (7) We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups
- (8) We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed

Question order randomized.

Respondents are randomly presented with four statements, one from each following pair: (1) and (2), (3) and (4), (5) and (6), (7) and (8).

Answers coded from 1 = *Strongly disagree* to 4 = *Strongly agree*.

Authoritarianism

“Although there are a number of qualities that people feel children should have, every person thinks that some qualities are more important than others. Below are pairs of desirable qualities. For each pair please indicate which quality you think is more important for a child to have.”

- Independence or respect for elders
- Be considerate or well-behaved
- Have obedience or self-reliance
- Have curiosity or good manners

Question order randomized.

Answers coded 1 when a pro-authoritarian trait is chosen (respect for elders, well-behaved, obedience, good manners) and 0 otherwise.

Anti-American attitudes

- What is your opinion of the United States?
- What is your opinion of Americans?

Question order randomized.

Answers coded from 1 = *Very unfavorable* to 4 = *Very favorable*.

Support for confrontation

“The degree of confrontation between Russia and the U.S. is currently on the rise. There are different views on how Russia should act in this situation. What is your position?”

For your response, please use the scale from 0 to 10 below. If you think that Russia should avoid direct confrontation with the U.S., choose answers close to 0. If you think that Russia should openly challenge the U.S., choose answers close to 10. If your position is somewhere in between, choose answers close to 5.”

Table S1. Descriptive statistics for the core variables

	Range	Mean	SD
Authoritarianism	0–1	0.45	0.27
SDO	1–4	1.96	0.55
Political grievances	1–4	2.69	0.59
Cultural grievances	1–4	2.73	0.58
Anti-American attitudes	1–4	2.34	0.59
Support for confrontation	0–10	4.01	2.41

Table S2. Full results of the regression models

	Political grievances	Cultural grievances	Anti-American attitudes	Support for confrontation
Authoritarianism	0.15*** (0.04)	0.26*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)
SDO	-0.10** (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Age (younger than 40)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)
Gender (female)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.10** (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.25*** (0.04)
Education (higher)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)
Residence (city)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.10** (0.03)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Ethnicity (non-Russian)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Constant	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)
<i>N</i>	778	778	778	766

Note. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table S3. Full results of the path model

	Estimate
Political grievances ←	
Authoritarianism	0.11*** (0.03)
SDO	-0.11** (0.04)
Age	0.20*** (0.04)
Gender (female)	-0.04* (0.01)
Education (higher)	0.01 (0.02)
Urbanization (city)	-0.01 (0.02)
Ethnicity (Russian)	0.01 (0.02)
Intercept	0.49*** (0.03)
Cultural grievances ←	
Authoritarianism	0.19*** (0.02)
SDO	0.02 (0.04)
Age	0.18*** (0.04)
Gender (female)	-0.04** (0.01)
Education (higher)	-0.00 (0.02)
Urbanization (city)	-0.05** (0.01)
Ethnicity (Russian)	0.03 (0.02)
Intercept	0.46*** (0.03)
Anti-American attitudes ←	
Political grievances	0.25*** (0.04)
Cultural grievances	0.25*** (0.04)
Authoritarianism	0.06* (0.03)
SDO	0.01 (0.04)
Age	0.10* (0.04)
Gender (female)	-0.03* (0.01)
Education (higher)	0.01 (0.01)
Urbanization (city)	-0.01 (0.01)
Ethnicity (Russian)	0.01 (0.02)
Intercept	0.12**

Support for confrontation ←	(0.04)
Political grievances	0.27*** (0.05)
Cultural grievances	0.07 (0.05)
Anti-American attitudes	0.22*** (0.04)
Authoritarianism	0.02 (0.03)
SDO	0.10* (0.04)
Age	0.02 (0.05)
Gender (female)	-0.10*** (0.02)
Education (higher)	-0.01 (0.02)
Urbanization (city)	0.02 (0.02)
Ethnicity (Russian)	-0.04 (0.02)
Intercept	0.14** (0.05)
<hr/>	
Error variances	
Political grievances	0.04*** (0.00)
Cultural grievances	0.03*** (0.00)
Anti-American attitudes	0.03*** (0.00)
Support for confrontation	0.05*** (0.00)
<hr/>	
Error covariances	
Political grievances, Cultural grievances	0.01*** (0.00)

Note. $N = 764$. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$