

Voters' Reactions to Real Politicians' Tweets
Framing White Supremacy and Radical Islam as Terrorist Threats

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Abstract

In recent decades discussions of terrorist threat in the United States has focused almost exclusively on radical Islam, but progressive politicians increasingly discuss white supremacy as a form of terrorism. We explore reactions to this new rhetoric using two survey experiments. In both studies, respondents are exposed to real tweets of Democratic and Republican politicians discussing white supremacy and radical Islam as security threats. We formulate two alternative expectations. First, partisans may diverge in their assessments of Republicans' anti-Muslim appeals after viewing messages from Democratic politicians linking white supremacy to terrorism. Second, white respondents may be more accepting of anti-Muslim rhetoric after viewing tweets framing white supremacy as a threat. Both experiments show significant increases in the perceived acceptability of anti-Muslim appeals when they are presented after messages about white supremacy, and these results are driven by white Democrats. Our results highlight potential side effects of political communication about terrorism.

Keywords: political communication, radical Islam, social media, terrorism, threat, white supremacy

Scholars have documented multiple consequences of invoking terrorist threat in political communication: decreasing support for civil liberties (Davis and Silver 2004), changing evaluations of political leaders (Albertson and Gadarian 2016; Merolla and Zechmeister 2013), and shifting foreign policy opinions (Gadarian 2010; Huddy et al. 2005; Malhotra and Popp 2012). In recent history, terrorist threat in American media was connected almost exclusively to Muslims. Content analyses of U.S. news media have revealed consistent patterns in news coverage of terrorist events emphasizing Muslim identity of perpetrators (Bleich and Van der Veen 2021; Lajevardi 2021). Ultimately, stereotypes linking Muslims to violence have been mobilized to support policies such as the “war on terror” (Sides and Gross 2013).

A relatively new phenomenon in mainstream American politics is understanding extreme forms of white identity as a national security threat. In 2021, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a report warning that threats from domestic violent extremists motivated by hatred of minority populations presented a major security threat.¹ These assessments are now reflected in the rhetoric of prominent Democratic politicians. For instance, in his first presidential address to Congress, President Joe Biden described white supremacy as a domestic terror threat that the country could not ignore.² Similar statements can be found in the social media posts of other high-profile Democrats, including members of Congress.

In this paper, we explore voters’ reactions to new rhetoric that frames white supremacy as a security threat. Our design takes advantage of the way these appeals mirror more common messages linking terrorism with Muslims. Specifically, we explore how exposure to messages about white supremacy as a terrorist threat (that come almost exclusively Democratic politicians)

¹ <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/UnclassSummaryofDVEAssessment-17MAR21.pdf>

² <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/04/28/biden-calls-white-supremacy-terrorism-speech-congress/4884034001/>

impacts perceived acceptability of more common appeals connecting terrorism to radical Islam (coming primarily from Republican politicians). Building upon existing literature, we propose two alternative hypotheses. One is that when Democrats and Republicans view partisan messaging on white supremacy as a security threat, they diverge even further in their assessments of anti-Muslim appeals. The other is that exposure to messages linking white supremacy to terrorism increases the acceptability of anti-Muslim appeals among whites.

We test these hypotheses in two original survey experiments, in which we ask respondents about the acceptability of anti-Muslim tweets by Republican politicians before or after exposing them to tweets by Democratic politicians that connect white supremacy to terrorism. We find that political messaging framing white supremacy as a security threat increases the acceptability of anti-Muslim appeals and that this effect is driven by white Democrats. We discuss the implications of our findings for American politics more generally.

Party, Race, and Message Acceptability

How does exposure to partisan messages linking certain groups or events to terrorist threat impact citizens' opinions? The default prediction from existing American public opinion literature is partisan polarization. Individuals accept in-party cues by adjusting their political positions (Leeper and Slothuus 2014), and simultaneously reject cues coming from the out-party (Goren, Federico, and Kittilson 2009), resulting in opinion polarization.

The polarizing effects of political communication should be particularly high under the current levels of elite partisan polarization in U.S. politics (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Theriault 2008). Indeed, elite-level polarization changes how the public evaluates political issues by shifting its focus toward partisan endorsements and away from substantive information (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013). Given affective polarization in the mass public

(Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012), which is largely driven by negative partisanship (Abramowitz and Webster 2018; Bankert 2021), partisans' propensity to respond to out-party messages by doubling-down on their pre-existing beliefs can be even stronger.

Partisanship, however, is only one group identity that powerfully shapes Americans' behaviors and opinions—another is race. White Americans have been adopting more conservative politics and voting more Republican in response to immigration, changing demographics, and related group status threats (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). Perceived group status threat also makes white Americans more likely to approve of explicit anti-minority appeals and view more favorably the politicians making such appeals (Christiani 2021). In other words, the political views of white Americans are increasingly influenced by their racial identity—and it pushes them to the right (Jardina 2019).

Even though U.S. parties are increasingly sorted on the basis of race (Mason 2018; Zhirkov and Valentino 2022), whites still constitute a plurality of the Democratic coalition. And white Democrats sometimes exhibit conservative preferences on issues that implicate race. For instance, racial resentment makes a better predictor of opposition to affirmative action among white Democrats than it does among white Republicans (Feldman and Huddy 2005). In addition, white Democrats report colder feelings to their own party after being exposed to Democratic political ads designed to court Latino voters (Ostfeld 2019). Most recently, white identity has been found to be more strongly associated with opposition to immigration among white Democrats than among white Republicans (Perez et al. 2021).

This brief review informs two alternative expectations. First, Democrats may consider an anti-Muslim message from a Republican politician to be less acceptable after seeing a message from a Democratic politician linking white supremacy to terrorism—with an opposite effect

among Republicans (*party effect*). Second, whites, independently of their partisanship, may see an anti-Muslim message coming from a Republican politician as more acceptable after seeing a message from a Democratic politician linking white supremacy to terrorism (*race effect*). Table 1 summarizes the two hypotheses.

Table 1. Summary of the two hypotheses

Respondents	Effect on acceptability	
	Party	Race
White Democrats	–	+
White Republicans	+	+

Study 1: Student Sample

To test our hypotheses, we carried out an original online survey-experimental study in March and April 2020.³ It proceeded as follows. Respondents were presented with screenshots of real tweets by Democratic and Republican members of Congress (see Figure 1 for sample tweets). Tweets by Democratic representatives addressed white supremacy as a national security threat whereas tweets by Republican representatives addressed radical Islam as a national security threat. Half of respondents saw a Republican politician’s tweet first (control condition) whereas the other half saw a Republican politician’s tweet after a Democratic politician’s tweet (treatment condition).⁴ Tweets presented to respondents were drawn randomly from a predefined selection of six tweets by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (Democratic representative) and six tweets by Louie Gohmert and Steve King (Republican representatives).⁵ This was done in order to

³ See Online Appendix for sample demographics.

⁴ In the control condition, respondents saw a Democratic tweet after a Republican tweet. We use the corresponding comparison (perceived appropriateness of a Democratic tweet on white supremacy before vs. after seeing a Republican tweet on radical Islam) to test whether the exposure effect is one-sided (only exposure to a tweet about white supremacy increases acceptability of anti-Muslim rhetoric) or two-sided (exposure to a tweet about radical Islam also increases acceptability of rhetoric linking white supremacy to terrorism).

⁵ When presented with tweets, respondents were informed of representatives’ partisanship in order to account for potential differences in political knowledge.

minimize potentially idiosyncratic effects of each specific tweet.⁶ The selection of representatives was purposeful for the sake of external validity: these members of Congress were the ones who tweeted about the chosen issues (white supremacy for Democrats and radical Islam for Republicans) most often. After viewing each tweet, respondents were asked the following question: “Do you think that the language that the politician used in the tweet is appropriate for an elected official—regardless of the point that they are trying to make?” The response scale ranged from 1 = *Completely inappropriate* to 7 = *Completely appropriate*. To see whether the effects are limited to acceptability, we also asked respondents about agreement with tweets and emotional reactions to them.⁷

Figure 1. Tweet examples



(a) Democratic tweet



(b) Republican tweet

Results

Results are presented in Table 2 by respondent partisanship. Hereinafter, for the purpose of the analyses, we treat respondents who are party-leaning independents as partisans. We find a significant positive effect of the treatment condition for Democratic respondents. When respondents see a Republican politician’s tweet (on radical Islam as a security threat) after a Democratic one (on white supremacy as a security threat), they rate the Republican politician’s tweet as more appropriate—compared to when they view the same Republican tweet first. The

⁶ See Online Appendix for the full list of tweets.

⁷ See Online Appendix for the questions and response options.

effect is also relatively large in terms of magnitude: approximately 0.8 on a 7-point scale. In other words, exposure to messages linking white supremacy to terrorism leads Democrats to see rhetoric against Muslims from the Republican side as more acceptable. We find no significant treatment effects for Republican respondents. The average level of perceived acceptability of anti-Muslim tweets is higher among Republicans than among Democrats—but the means are still low enough to not be concerned about a potential ceiling effect.

Table 2. Mean levels of perceived appropriateness of anti-Muslim tweets by experimental condition and treatment effects by respondents’ partisanship, Study 1

	Control	Treatment	Difference	<i>N</i>
Democrats	2.60	3.42	0.82 [0.44, 1.21]	284
Republicans	4.54	4.05	-0.49 [-1.05, 0.08]	147

Note. 95% confidence intervals in brackets (difference estimates only).

We implement additional tests to see whether the increase in acceptability of Republican messaging is indeed a reaction to messaging about white supremacy. Specifically, we estimate the potential mirroring effect by comparing perceived acceptability of Democratic tweets depending on whether they are seen before or after Republican ones. We find no significant effects (see Table A1 in Online Appendix). In other words, a reliable increase in acceptability is unique to the situation in which anti-Muslim messages are seen after ones linking white supremacy to terrorism. We are also unable to establish reliable effects on outcomes other than acceptability (agreement and emotional reaction; see Tables A2 and A3 in Online Appendix).

Study 2: General Population Sample

We ran our replication study with a sample of U.S. adults in July 2020.⁸ The experimental

⁸ See Online Appendix for sample demographics.

procedure replicated the one used in Study 1. Half of respondents saw a Republican politician's tweet first (control condition) whereas the other half saw a Republican politician's tweet after that of a Democratic politician (treatment condition).⁹ Tweets were rated in terms of perceived appropriateness; questions on agreement and emotional reactions were also included in Study 2.

A Democratic tweet and a Republican tweet presented to each respondent were, again, randomly chosen from predefined lists of real tweets (six for each party) by members of Congress. At the same time, the selection of tweets for Study 2 was different. In Study 1, all Democratic tweets were from Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez whereas Republican tweets were from Louie Gohmert and Steve King. However, this selection could raise concerns about respondents' reactions to the specific politicians rather than to the tweets' content. Therefore, for Study 2 we used tweets from four different Democratic members of Congress. The selection of Republican tweets also included tweets from more representatives.¹⁰

Results

We, again, start by documenting the treatment effects (difference between the treatment condition and the control condition) for the perceived appropriateness of anti-Muslim tweets. Results are presented in Table 3 by respondent partisanship. Estimates show that the findings of Study 1 are exactly replicated: messages linking white supremacy to terrorism impacted the perceived appropriateness of a Republican politician's tweet for Democratic respondents alone. This effect is positive, with exposure to a Democratic tweet on the threat of white supremacy leading Democrats to rate a Republican tweet on the threat of radical Islam as more appropriate. We also confirm that, similar to Study 1, a reliable increase in perceived acceptability is not

⁹ Similar to Study 1, respondents saw a Democratic tweet after a Republican tweet in the control condition.

¹⁰ See Online Appendix for the full list of tweets.

found when a Democratic tweet is seen after a Republican one (if anything, Democrats rate tweets about white supremacy as less acceptable after seeing tweets about radical Islam; see Table A4 in Online Appendix). Agreement and emotional reactions to anti-Muslim tweets are not reliably affected (see Tables A5 and A6 in Online Appendix).

Table 3. Mean levels of perceived appropriateness of anti-Muslim tweets by experimental condition and treatment effects by respondents’ partisanship, Study 2

	Control	Treatment	Difference	<i>N</i>
Democrats	3.11	3.72	0.61 [0.10, 1.11]	231
Republicans	4.94	4.94	<0.01 [-0.41, 0.42]	299

Note. 95% confidence intervals in brackets (difference estimates only).

We also take advantage of a difference in the Study 2 design—the fact that respondents were shown tweets from multiple Democratic representatives—to explore potential messenger effects. Specifically, we estimate the experimental effects independently across different tweets and then compare them across politicians. We find no differences between Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and other Democratic representatives ($F_{1,450} < 0.01, p = .972$), as well as no gender difference ($F_{1,450} = 0.62, p = .430$). Even though these results suggest no messenger effect, they should be treated as only suggestive due to relatively small sample sizes.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have explored potential reactions to the emerging rhetoric in American political communication that frames white supremacy as a terrorist threat. We specifically focused on how it may impact the acceptability of more common appeals linking terrorism to radical Islam. We have outlined two alternative hypotheses and tested them in two survey-experimental studies, one using a student sample and one using a general population sample. Results of both studies show that exposure to messages from Democratic politicians addressing white supremacy

as a security threat increases the perceived acceptability of appeals from Republican politicians linking Muslims to terrorism, and that this effect is driven by white Democrats. At the same time, there are no reliable effects on agreement or emotional reactions.

The exact reasons for these findings are not fully clear. For instance, white Democrats may be particularly sensitive to messages connecting white supremacy to terrorism because of partisan and racial identity cross-pressures—whereas, for white Republicans, political implications of these identities are aligned. It is also possible that Democrats and Republicans perceive and process threats differently, but testing this mechanism would require data on respondents' levels of threat perception after exposure to the stimuli.

It is also necessary to emphasize that the chosen research design should have made our test favorable to finding the effects of partisanship vis-a-vis the effects of race. First, white supremacy is an extreme form of white identity that is generally rejected by white Democrats (Jardina Kalmoe, and Gross 2020), making reaction against this particular message more difficult to find. Second, cues coming from specific politicians tend to be more polarizing than ones simply associated with party labels (Nicholson 2012). Thus, it should have been particularly difficult for white Democrats to find anti-Muslim tweets from named Republican politicians acceptable, especially ones coming from such controversial figures as Steve King.

An important aspect of our experiment, which has implications for interpretation of the findings, is the nature of the stimuli: real-world tweets from Democratic and Republican members of Congress. This is a common design in studies on social media messaging (Ballard et al. 2022; Bowler Carreras, and Merolla 2022), that increases external validity by presenting respondents with the same stimuli they can be exposed to in real life. At the same time, this design involves constraints on randomization of certain attributes. Examples include tweets'

length, occasional conflation of issues, and messenger identity. Potential moderating effects of these factors can be interesting topics for future studies.

Our findings have important implications for American politics more broadly. Scholars of political communication have recently noted the growing acceptability of explicit group-based appeals in U.S. campaigns (Valentino, Neuner, and Vandebroek 2018). Our survey-experimental results suggest that this phenomenon may be at least partly explained as a reaction against progressive messaging on race and religion. Even exposure to messages mentioning white supremacy, which is widely condemned across the political spectrum, makes voters more accepting of rhetorical attacks against minority groups. The fact that this effect is produced exclusively by white Democrats indicates that partisan sorting on the basis of race and racial attitudes is not complete. Future studies should explore whether such effects extend beyond the case of discussing white supremacy as a form of domestic terrorism.

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Sample demographics

Study 1

Participants were political science major undergraduate students from a large public university in the southeastern United States. The survey was completed by 460 non-Hispanic white respondents.¹¹ Male–female ratio was 41.7% to 58.3%. In terms of socioeconomic status, 27% of students described their families as upper class, 58.6% as middle class, 11.8% as working class, and 2.6% as lower class. Partisanship was 49.5% Democratic, 22.6% Republican, and 27.9% independent.

Study 2

Participants were recruited using the Lucid panel that was shown to approximate American national demographics (Coppock and McClellan 2019). The survey was completed by 700 non-Hispanic white respondents.¹² The sample characteristics were as follows. Mean age was 44 years old. Gender ratio was 48.4% male to 51.6% female. College education was reported by 40.1% of respondents. Median income was between \$40,000 and \$44,999. In terms of partisanship, 36.6% of respondents were Democrats, 38.5% were Republicans, and 24.9% were independents.

¹¹ The questionnaire was also completed by 235 nonwhite respondents, including Hispanics. Here and in Study 2, they were excluded from the analysis due to the nature of our hypotheses.

¹² The questionnaire was also completed by 276 nonwhite respondents, including Hispanics.

Survey questions

Agreement

“Do you agree with the general point that the politician is trying to make in this tweet -- regardless of the language that they used to express it?”

Answers coded from 1 = “Strongly disagree” to 7 = “Strongly agree”

Emotional response

“How much does this tweet make you feel...?”

- Anxious
- Proud
- Angry
- Hopeful
- Worried
- Excited

[Order randomized]

Answers coded from 1 = “None at all” to 5 = “Extremely”

Democratic tweets, Study 1



Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez
@AOC

White supremacy has quickly turned into a domestic terror crisis in the US.

They rely on you thinking "it's not a big deal." It is a big deal.

White supremacy now makes up the majority of domestic terrorism in the United States. They radicalize online.



Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez
@AOC

& again, this time asking the FBI.

It seems easier to label domestic, self-radicalized shooters who are Muslim as terrorists.

Yet white supremacists, who are responsible for far more violence in the US, often escape these charges.

Now they're the #1 source of domestic terror ↓



Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez
@AOC

Video games aren't causing mass shootings, white supremacy is.

Sadly the GOP refuse to acknowledge that, bc their strategy relies on rallying a white supremacist base.

That's why the President hosts stadiums of people chanting "send her back" & targets Congress-members of color.



Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez
@AOC

White supremacists were responsible for *ALL* race-based domestic terrorism in 2018. 100%.

Trump's DoJ & Barr then worked **to hide that report from Congress**--all while defunding federal programs to combat white supremacist violence.

This is a white supremacist administration.



Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez
@AOC

When a mass shooting is committed by a Muslim, the crime is almost automatically labeled as Domestic Terrorism.

But when White Supremacists like Dylann Roof shot up a black church, or attack the Tree of Life Synagogue, the FBI declined to charge them w/ Domestic Terrorism.

Why?



Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez
@AOC

White supremacy is a fundamentally violent ideology that's been growing at an alarming rate, fueling one mass shooting after another.

It's about time we recognized white nationalism for the major terrorist threat that it is.

Republican tweets, Study 1



Louie Gohmert
@replouiegohmert

Could Someone Please Inform the Federal Judiciary That Jihadists Are Muslim? - bit.ly/2nvvlpF via @NRO



Steve King
@SteveKingIA

The #Muslim Invasion of Europe: a clear concise description of transformation of Western European Culture by hijrah.



Steve King
@SteveKingIA

Our hearts and prayers go out for the French victims of yet another terrorist attack. We must defeat the ideology of Islamic Jihad.



Louie Gohmert
@replouiegohmert

Coming soon: More immigrants from Muslim nations than population of D.C. -- 680,000 washex.am/1QlwUB5 via @DCExaminer



Steve King
@SteveKingIA

Sweden: What America is becoming. 12 terrorist bombings in 24 days. Sweden, highest per capita immigration in world. pgj.cc/dKgZJP



Steve King
@SteveKingIA

Are shop manuals for Boeings written in Arabic? A 30 year Arabic\only mechanic, whose brother is ISIS, sabotages a plane & NO terrorist consequence? "I do admit the guilt," Abdul-Majeed Marouf Ahmed Alani, 60, said through an Arabic interpreter...

Democratic tweets, Study 2



Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez
@AOC

& again, this time asking the FBI.

It seems easier to label domestic, self-radicalized shooters who are Muslim as terrorists.

Yet white supremacists, who are responsible for far more violence in the US, often escape these charges.

Now they're the #1 source of domestic terror 📉



Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez
@AOC

White supremacy is a fundamentally violent ideology that's been growing at an alarming rate, fueling one mass shooting after another.

It's about time we recognized white nationalism for the major terrorist threat that it is.



Hakeem Jeffries
@RepJeffries

Mother Emanuel AME Church. Tree of Life Synagogue. Cielo Vista Massacre.

White Supremacy = Domestic Terrorism.

It must be crushed.

Not coddled.

There are not very fine people on both sides.



Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez
@AOC

When a mass shooting is committed by a Muslim, the crime is almost automatically labeled as Domestic Terrorism.

But when White Supremacists like Dylann Roof shot up a black church, or attack the Tree of Life Synagogue, the FBI declined to charge them w/ Domestic Terrorism.

Why?



Congresswoman Bass
@RepKarenBass

Today the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the rise of hate crimes and white nationalism in this country.

This country DOES have a problem with domestic terrorism. We DO have a problem with White Supremacy. Congress should work to address it.



Rep. Don Beyer
@RepDonBeyer

Check out my latest, in [@businessinsider](#):

"America has a serious white-supremacy problem, which is helping fuel a rise in hate crimes, violence, and domestic terrorism, and it's time for Congress to do something to combat this growing threat to our nation."

Republican tweets, Study 2



Steve King
@SteveKingIA

Our hearts and prayers go out for the French victims of yet another terrorist attack. We must defeat the ideology of Islamic Jihad.



Steve King
@SteveKingIA

The [#Muslim](#) Invasion of Europe: a clear concise description of transformation of Western European Culture by hijrah.



Kevin McCarthy
@GOPLeader

Islamic terrorism must be stopped, and we must make changes to defend our nation & destroy terrorism at the root. majorityleader.gov/2016/06/13/the...



Steve King
@SteveKingIA

Are shop manuals for Boeings written in Arabic? A 30 year Arabic\only mechanic, whose brother is ISIS, sabotages a plane & NO terrorist consequence? "I do admit the guilt," Abdul-Majeed Marouf Ahmed Alani, 60, said through an Arabic interpreter...



Louie Gohmert
@replouiegohmert

Could Someone Please Inform the Federal Judiciary That Jihadists Are Muslim? - bit.ly/2nvwlpF via [@NRO](#)



Mo Brooks
@RepMoBrooks

Koran: "We shall certainly strike terror into the hearts of those who have disbelieved" (3:151) & "Verily, the disbelievers are your open enemies." (4:101).

On 9/11/01, fundamentalist Muslims attacked America, killing 2,996.

We must remember & learn. History must not repeat. Mo

Table S1. Mean levels of perceived appropriateness of Democratic tweets by condition and estimated differences by respondents' partisanship, Study 1

	Seen first	Seen second	Difference	<i>N</i>
Democrats	5.68	5.65	-0.03 [-0.34, 0.29]	284
Republicans	3.46	3.83	0.37 [-0.19, 0.93]	147

Note. 95% confidence intervals in brackets (difference estimates only).

Table S2. Mean levels of agreement with Republican tweets by condition and estimated differences by respondents' partisanship, Study 1

	Seen first	Seen second	Difference	<i>N</i>
Democrats	2.81	2.53	-0.27 [-0.64, 0.09]	284
Republicans	4.44	4.05	-0.39 [-0.89, 0.09]	147

Note. 95% confidence intervals in brackets (difference estimates only).

Table S3. Mean emotional reactions to Republican tweets by condition and estimated differences by respondents' partisanship, Study 1

	Seen first	Seen second	Difference	<i>N</i>
Democrats	2.25	2.21	-0.04 [-0.22, 0.14]	284
Republicans	2.76	2.83	0.07 [-0.13, 0.27]	147

Note. 95% confidence intervals in brackets (difference estimates only).

Table S4. Mean levels of perceived appropriateness of Democratic tweets by condition and estimated differences by respondents' partisanship, Study 2

	Seen first	Seen second	Difference	<i>N</i>
Democrats	5.34	4.79	-0.53 [-1.01, -0.06]	231
Republicans	3.92	3.99	0.07 [-0.43, 0.57]	299

Note. 95% confidence intervals in brackets (difference estimates only).

Table S5. Mean levels of agreement with Republican tweets by condition and estimated differences by respondents' partisanship, Study 2

	Seen first	Seen second	Difference	<i>N</i>
Democrats	3.54	3.62	0.08 [-0.40, 0.56]	228
Republicans	5.11	5.04	-0.07 [-0.45, 0.31]	298

Note. 95% confidence intervals in brackets (difference estimates only).

Table S6. Mean emotional reactions to Republican tweets by condition and estimated differences by respondents' partisanship, Study 2

	Seen first	Seen second	Difference	<i>N</i>
Democrats	2.43	2.44	0.01 [-0.18, 0.21]	231
Republicans	2.93	2.90	-0.03 [-0.20, 0.15]	298

Note. 95% confidence intervals in brackets (difference estimates only).

References

Coppock, Alexander, and Oliver A. McClellan. 2019. "Validating the Demographic, Political, Psychological, and Experimental Results Obtained from a New Source of Online Survey Respondents." *Research & Politics* 6 (1). <https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168018822174>